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C h a p t e r  1  
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
1 . 1  P r o b l e m  A r e a  
  
Europe had in the 1970’s experienced the consequences of the breakdown of Bretton Woods, 
the fixed exchange rates regime. Politicians were then confronted with high inflation, decreasing 
competitiveness and unstable exchange rates (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012). 
Up to this date, Keynesianism had been the dominant framework of economics for several 
decades. The era of Keynesianism was known as the ‘golden days’ of welfare expansion and social 
policy and problems of unemployment were linked to low growth and insufficient demand for 
labour (ibid: 6). A common tool used to accommodate the consequences of the recession was to 
spend heavily on social policies. This is the well-known demand-side economics of Keynesianism 
which developed the post-war welfare states in Europe (ibid). The purpose of this was to maintain 
full employment through economic growth, but these goals eventually triggered a self-reinforcing 
inflationary dynamic and combined with the oil crisis in the 1970’s meant that unemployment levels 
and social expenditures grew while the economy stagnated. This is commonly referred to as 
‘stagflation’ and as a consequence neoliberal ideas increasingly gained influence (ibid). 
Now, instead of focusing on the demand-side of the economy one began to look at the supply-
side to counter the recession, meaning that the focus now became on keeping prices stable and to 
better the conditions of corporations. The election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan marked 
a beginning of a new epoch in economic and social policy. The focus on full employment was 
switched with a focus on balanced budgets, stable currencies, central bank independency, low 
inflation, privatisation and not least welfare retrenchment, 
The generous welfare scheme set out by Keynesianism was perceived by Neoliberals as 
creating a ‘culture of dependency’ (ibid: 7). The reasoning here was that inequality makes people 
willing to work. Thus, unemployment was not seen, as in Keynesianism, as being due to insufficient 
demand for labour, but instead as a consequence of poor job motivation and lack of incentives to 
work (ibid: 33-34). 
2 
 
However, during the 1980’s and 1990’s opposition against the neoliberal paradigm emerged, 
as it seemed to worsen societal problems and increase poverty rates all over Europe.  
With the elections of Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair, Wim Wok and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
new thoughts on social policy came to the fore. These were neither Keynesianists believing any 
social policy was a good policy, nor were they neoliberal believing that welfare retrenchment was 
ideal (ibid: 46). 
According to some authors they represented what is called the Social Investment Perspective, 
arguing that the economic and social focus yet again were under change. Social policy in this regard 
is thought of as being an essential contribution to the economy, as it is argued that unemployment is 
neither due to a lack of demand of labour nor due to a lack of willingness to work. In contrast, the 
Social Investment Perspective states that unemployment is due a lack of adequate skills (ibid). 
Thus, it is necessary focus on policies that invest in human capital, such as education and re- and 
up-skilling, in order to increase the competitiveness and the job supply and to accommodate this, 
the state needed to be empowering (ibid). 
Investment in this sense, means ‘preparing rather than repairing’ and  therefore policies such 
as early childhood education and care, higher education and lifelong training combined with active 
labour market policies, women’s employment, better integration and finally ‘flexicurity’ are central 
(ibid: 92-93). Active labour market policy is a key term here. It serves to reintegrate people into the 
labour market instead of passively supporting them. It may for example be demands to an 
unemployed for taking courses that can increase his or her skills and thus make them more 
attractive to the labour market. 
The idea behind this is that by helping people to enter or re-enter the labour market fast by 
actively supporting them while unemployed will better the economy in the long run – because 
Social Investment is expensive and should be planned over a long time period (ibid). 
The Social Investment Perspective was according to (ibid) adopted at the European Union 
level. It was the foundation on which the European Employment Strategy (EES) was built upon. 
The EES sought to invest in human capital, broaden education, promote flexicurity and to 
accommodate the needs of the labour market in order to increase employment with a special focus 
on women and elderly. 
However, in spite of the intentions, the EES was, due to its ambiguity in nature, interpreted 
very differently across the European Union (EU) something that resulted in very different outcomes 
in terms of how the goal of increasing the level of employment was achieved. According to the 
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authors (ibid) this became evident, as there developed two approaches to accomplish the goals of 
the EES. Firstly, countries like Denmark, Sweden and Norway follow what is termed the ‘Social 
Democratic’ approach to social investment. This is a more generous approach in terms of the degree 
of universal welfare, active labour market policy and social security compared to the other approach 
termed the ‘Third Way’. The Third Way approach has an increased focus on incentive measures and 
these are primarily concerned with removing social services to make people work. Thus, this 
approach is less generous and its focus is not to the same degree on educating or re- and up-skilling 
people in order to make them more attractive to the labour market, but it follows a more neoliberal 
thought. 
Thus, as mentioned, the ambiguity of the EES meant that it was interpreted very differently 
across the EU and the question is why it came to be so ambiguous, a question this project will 
investigate in the following. To accomplish this, the project will look into the major decision 
making process revolving around the EES, namely the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and 
try to theorise about why this specific decision process was chosen to develop the EES over the 
traditional Community Method. 
This leads the project to the following problem formulation: 
 
 
1 . 2  P r o b l e m  F o r m u l a t i o n  
Why did the member states choose the Open Method of Coordination over The Community 
Method to develop the European Employment Strategy? 
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C h a p t e r  2  
M e t h o d s  
2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This chapter will serve as the project’s methodological chapter and will be revolving around 
two main sections. The first is the Analytical Strategy and the Limitations of the Project that will 
present and limit this project’s strategy for analysing and thus answering the problem formulation. 
The second section, Choice of Case Study, will concern itself with the reasons for examining only 
one case to study. 
2 . 2  A n a l y t i c a l  S t r a t e g y  a n d  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
P r o j e c t  
This project will theorise the reasons behind the choice of the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) with the European Employment Strategy (EES) as a case. The analysis will begin with four 
separate sections where each of the four approaches to European integration will be utilised to 
theorise as to why the OMC was and is used to develop the EES. In this way this way the project 
will be able to account for a nuanced perspective of the possible reasons behind the OMC. 
Firstly, an analysis with a Neofunctionalist focus will commence followed by a Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist one as Liberal Intergovernmentalism also serves as a critique of the former. 
These are followed by Historical Institutionalism and Constructivism. 
Finally, all conclusions reached through the four sections will be summarised in a final 
conclusion that will serve to make a comprehensive understanding of the reasons behind choosing 
the OMC. 
Thus, this project sets out to theoretically approach the OMC to go beyond a descriptive 
approach. This is done to discover and explain expected outcomes and developments from a 
theoretical perspective. The project does not try to empirically prove a certain theoretical point of 
view, rather to generate a comprehensive theoretical framework through which the problem 
formulation is answered. The project is theoretically founded and the conclusions reached will 
therefore be as a result of an analysis which answers the problem formulation through theories 
rather than an intricate empirical study. 
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2 . 3  C h o i c e  o f  C a s e  S t u d y  
Lijphart argues for the relevance of case studies in the sense that it through them is made 
possible to be specific on a single subject, instead of being speaking generally of a wider subject. 
This will, according to Lijphart, create a more in depth perspective of the given case chosen 
(Lijphart, 1971). A deeper focus thus creates a better knowledge of that single area. He though 
argues that a single case study cannot create the foundation for a general theoretical approach, or in 
fact a theory itself. Though this may not be possible he states that”[...] case studies can make an 
important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building in 
political science.”(ibid: 684). 
 
 In his political science review Lijphart divides the notion of a case study into six minor 
subcategories that is organised by their individual relationship between theory an empirical data. 
(ibid: 691). For instance he mentions a type of case study that he labels an atheoretical case study in 
which a researcher focus more on spotting tendencies in the gathered empirical data rather than 
trying to either prove or disprove an already established theory. Lijphart refers to these types of case 
studies as being the ”traditional” case studies (ibid) as they are the most descriptive and most 
accessible which thus makes them the most commonly used. 
 
 This project utilises a case study in the sense that it looks at the EES as its case and through 
this case try to analyse different theoretical approaches as to how the OMC came to develop the 
EES. Thus when looking at the different case studies proposed by Lijphart ones attention draws to 
the term he labels ”theory-confirming” and ”theory-affirming” case studies. As the names state 
these types of case studies tries to either confirm or affirm or simply put one or more theories into 
perspective (ibid: 692). With this type of case study the project tries to discuss the outlines of the 
case, the EES, in regards to the theoretical framework of: Liberal institutionalism, 
Neofunctionalism, the OMC and Constructivism. The project will debate this case in attempt to 
either confirm or affirm the theories, or to the least put them into a discussion of how they were 
relevant in the formation of the EES. 
 
 The fact that a single case study was chosen rather than a multiple case study was among 
other things due to a time limit. By doing the single case study this time frame as well as a more in 
depth focus of the actual case was made possible. The single case study further allowed the more 
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theoretical approach where the theories held a more significant place. Had multiple case studies 
been conducted one might one the other hand have found data to found a hypothesis or conclusion 
on. This would be more time consuming, but on the other hand it may also have granted a broader 
perspective on the reasoning behind the EES for instance. 
 As mentioned this project looks at the EES, being a part of the OMC, as a case study to 
investigate discussions and preliminary work behind EU legislation. But the EU itself has described 
the OMC as a framework in which different policy areas were to develop (Eurofound, 2010). Many 
of these policy areas have nothing in particular to do with the EES, or employment as such. One 
could, as an example, point towards the Commissions Community action programme to battle 
discrimination (European Commision, Decision 2000/750/EC). When one looks at article one in 
this action programme one sees that it seeks to combat discrimination. Thus this is an action 
programme that has limited relation towards the EES. Hence, it is estimated, by the authors of this 
project, that it would be most beneficiary to do a case study on the EES and therefore exclude the 
action program against discrimination. This is done in order to avoid confusion between the two and 
to keep a better overview. Furthermore, focusing solely on the EES allows for more resources to be 
focused on this case alone. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
T h e o r e t i c a l  F r a m e w o r k  
3 . 1  G e n e r a l  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  T h e o r y  
In this chapter four approaches to accounting for European Union integration will be 
elaborated upon. Firstly, two comprehensive theories of European Union integration able to account 
for ‘the bigger picture’ are presented, then one focusing on the historical development and one able 
to account for the more intricate workings of the European Union are introduced. 
This project will thus firstly introduce Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
These theories are followed by the approaches, Historical Institutionalism and Constructivism. 
By utilising these different entry points to European integration, this project will be able to 
answer its problem formulation in a more nuanced manner. 
 
3 . 2  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  N e o f u n c t i o n a l i s m  
Neofunctionalism was initially created by Ernst B. Haas 1958 to be a grand theory capable of 
describing regional intergovernmental development (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 60). Though 
the theory was intended as being able to describe regional intergovernmental development on a 
general level, not only a single case, it is interlinked with the development of the EU. The following 
chapter will look upon and describe some of the most relevant terms and aspects of 
Neofunctionalism.  
 
3 . 2 . 1  N e o f u n c t i o n a l i s m  
 Neofunctionalism describes supranationalism as an important part of understanding the 
development of the EU (Haas, 1964: 58). Firstly, it is argued that an economic integration would 
necessarily lead to increased political integration (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 62). This is 
based upon the notion that all member states would gain from the economic integration and that this 
would be incentive enough for the states to engage in further political integration. It is further 
argued that especially with the development and deployment of the internal market in the 
Maastricht treaty, economic integration is not so much a zero-sum game, but that every member 
state wins out. In ”Beyond the Nation-State” Haas argues that some states may behave ”self-
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centered” in regards to its position at the negotiation table at supranational institutions such as the 
EU. This will, according to Haas, only lead to the disintegration of both the international 
institutions, such as the EU, and through the demise of this institution also the member states (Haas, 
1964: 58). 
  
 Neofunctionalism also focuses on the importance of supranational institutions (Jensen in 
Cini & Borragán, 2013: 62). It is argued, within Neofunctionalism, that these institutions will 
formulate their own agendas which will turnout more powerful than the agendas of member states. 
A good example is the Commission which have the only competence to propose legislation in the 
EU, giving it a powerful position in promoting institution agendas against the member states 
representatives. Furthermore it has its own vast bureaucracy at its disposal giving it a distinct 
knowledge advantage in the legislative process. The ECJ is another obvious example in that they 
have the right to interpret the EU legislation. If a member state tries to implement EU law in a 
different manner than intended by the EU, the ECJ can void such an attempt to circumvent the 
institutional agenda. Haas argues that this will lead to ”[…] institutions that possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”(ibid). 
 
 Elite Socialisation and loyalty transfer refer to a part of Neofunctionalism that deals with 
policy makers, politicians and EU-officials for a longer period of time. The theory argues that being 
exposed to the mechanisms of the EU would lead officials to become more attached to both 
colleagues and the process as well. It is argued that the officials value both their own position in the 
system and the expected positive outcomes of the systems, especially the positive results that they 
might attain through their work. This does inevitably transfer their loyalty from their own national 
member states' interests towards the interest of the EU.  
 
 This combined with the aspect of the officials socialising amongst themselves leads, 
according to the theory, towards an elitist technocratic system (ibid: 64). As this process would 
move more towards the technocratic paradigm it would become less politicised as most decisions 
would be taken amongst these elite socialised officials of the EU. Haas underlines this when he 
states that ”[...] the transitional ”system” enshrines the dominance of system-orientation over 
actor-orientation.”(ibid: 60) This dominance of system-orientation can be seen as meaning that the 
orientation towards the system, in this case the EU, holds more value than the orientation towards 
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the actors of the system, the member states. Thus the socialisation among elitists in this technocratic 
should not be seen as a necessarily bad thing but rather as something that benefits the entire system 
rather than benefiting some few individuals. It is argued that the individuals benefit more when the 
system as a whole benefit rather than focusing on individual needs and wants. 
  
 Spillover is a key aspect of Neofunctionalism and simply put describes positive effects of a 
cooperation or likewise that was not initially intended. Within the integration of the EU a goal of 
integration can be set in one area meaning that both officials, politicians and the EU institutions as 
such strive to achieve this goal (Haas, 2000). In order to achieve this set goal the policy makers 
often find themselves in a situation where it is necessary to formulate new laws on a given area. As 
a thought example one could imagine that the EU allows car companies to sell their cars in every 
member state and not just the one in which the cars were produced and first sold. This initial law 
process might be the focal point of the officials with the free movement of goods. But in the given 
example one could imagine that certain member states will complain about the quality and safety of 
the cars. This would force the EU make regulations in regards to car quality and safety.  This may 
in turn lead to the quality of the education of the car mechanics being questioned which in turn 
means that the EU might have to regulate on that as well. 
 
 Spillover can be divided into three different processes; Functional, Political and Cultivated 
spillover (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 63). These three types of spillover cover both different 
cases and different actors, and how these actors react towards the different cases. The first process, 
the process of functional spillover, covers the process of how different functionality of one type of 
cooperation leads to another. With the above example of the car mechanics the original purpose of 
legislation would be to allow the possibility of getting ones car repaired in another member state. 
The functional spillover here would be the aspect of relevant training of mechanics in the other 
member states. Though the said training was not the initial purpose and goal of the regulations it did 
in fact become a relevant factor of regulation. In this sense the spillover did not only affect the 
original intended functionality of one sector of regulation but in fact also other sectors of regulation, 
namely the education of the mechanics. 
 
 The second spillover effect, the political spillover, describes a situation where national 
political actors or interest groups argue for more integration within the EU to achieve certain goals. 
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This argumentation focus on the group's estimated increased success by transferring political 
decisions towards the EU rather than their own respective nation states. This thus creates a political 
spillover in the sense that political power, influence and loyalty is spilled over into the EU 
institutions. This type of spillover is closely related to the aspect of elite socialisation in which the 
different actors socialise with their European counterparts in order to achieve a common goal. 
Thirdly, there is the aspect of cultivated spillover effect in which supranational institutions, for 
instance the European Parliament or the Commission, play an important of integration (ibid). This 
type of spillover is dependent on and describes how these institutions focus their bargaining in 
regards to national interests. They might for instance focus mostly on arguments that point towards 
further integration and thus in some cases ignore or completely reject national interests (ibid). 
 
 Supranational interest groups is a term within Neofunctionalism that describes the 
regionalisation and internationalisation that takes place among different interest groups parallel to 
the integration of political institutions (ibid: 65). These groups include, but are not limited to, 
corporations, labour unions and NGOs as such. The neofunctionalist argumentation here is that 
when regional and continental opportunities arise for these different institutions they naturally seek 
to take advantage of these new situations that they find themselves in. A workers union may for 
instance start to cooperate with worker unions from other member states in order to put a higher 
level of pressure and through that in fact gain more influence with the supranational institutions 
such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. They will, from a neofunctionalist 
view, gain more benefits from this and therefore put more pressure on national governments for 
even further integration. These national organisations approach each other internationally as they 
see it more beneficiary to cooperate on this international EU-level (Haas, 1958: 313). 
 
 One of the more noticeable critiques, among others, of neofunctionalism is the slow pace of 
integrational, sometimes even a non-existing pace, progress of regional institutions especially in the 
EU (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 66). Especially during the 1970s and the 1980s this criticism 
seemed especially valid. With a focus on the 'empty chair' crisis of the mid 1960s as a clear example 
the development of European integration seemed to stall contrary to what neofunctionalist theorists 
had predicted. National governments, in this case especially the French, seemed to fail to see the 
advantages of further European integration. This led to a slowdown in integration and contradicted 
the prognoses of the neofunctional theorists. 
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 Some critics directed focus on neofunctionalisms focus on the supranational institutions 
rather than looking at the power and actions of nation states. Theorists like Moravcsik argued that 
member states had more influence in the development of the EU than given credit for in 
neofunctionalist theory. Rather, than stressing the importance of EU officials Moravcsik gives more 
credit to the interests and work of the national member states (Moravcsik, 1993). 
 
 
3 . 3  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  L i b e r a l  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m  
Following the section on Neofunctionalism is a theory that has become one of the influential 
theories for explaining European Integration. Liberal Intergovernmentalism was briefly mentioned 
in the end of the previous section and was essentially described as containing a critique of 
Neofunctionalism. Scholars pertaining to Liberal Intergovernmentalism argue that member states 
have indeed more influence than previously assumed and that they also seek to maximise their own 
interests. Thus, the EU is perceived as being an intergovernmental institution, rather than a 
supranational. 
3 . 3 . 1  L i b e r a l  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m  
In the late 1980' and the early 1990 Robert Putnam developed a theory that could be used to 
describe the relationship between the national and international spheres (Cini in Cini & Borragán, 
2013: 79). Putnam argues in this theory that politicians advocate the policies and other political 
changes that are the most advantageous in regards to their own country. In this sense, politicians in 
an international organisation like the UN or the EU act nation-centrically. Hence, when an 
organisation like the EU produces new legislation for its member states, this legislation is the result 
of bargaining between politicians from each member state that puts his or her member state higher 
than the EU itself. Therefore, it is argued, the relative bargaining power of each member state 
becomes important in the cooperation of the EU. This is on the basis that each state seeks to gain 
the most advantages for themselves while giving up as little sovereignty as possible. 
 
 It is argued that there is a demand for cooperation in international institutions such as the 
EU. This is described through three steps: National Preferences, ”intergovernmentalist theories of 
interstate relations,” (ibid) which compose the supply side and finally institutional delegation as 
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the third step of cooperation in the international institutions. The first step regarding national 
preferences is formed through the interests of different dominant groups within a member state. 
These groups, mostly economic in nature, influence the national political situation on different 
matters. This could for example be strong labour unions in Denmark making a set of demands for 
the Danish workforce, more breaks during the day, a higher salary etc. If this interest group is 
strong enough the issues will become a national policy which in turn will be a part of Denmark’s 
intergovernmental interests. Andrew Moravscik argues, in relation to the eastern EU-expansion in 
the early 2000's that ”[...] European governments,West and East, calculated the expected economic 
and geopolitical consequences of enlargement for their domestic societies and acted accordingly.” 
(Moravscik, 2005: 198). 
 The second step, the interstate relations, draws on the bargaining between the different 
governments. This does not come so much into life when trying to resolve a political problem as 
much as when trying to implement the solutions. Member states bargain with each other in order to 
reach an agreement on how to best implement new policies. Seeing that every state tries to get the 
best possible outcome the relative bargaining power of each state becomes important. 
Moravscik states that the relative bargaining power follows the relative preference intensity 
when it comes to interstate bargaining. He argues that the states for whom a closer cooperation on a 
given area is more beneficial tends to work more intensely on integration on that area (ibid: 199). 
This in short means that the states, that have the most to gain, tend to be more willing to 
compromise in order to promote the subject and to reach an agreement. It is further argued that 
within the EU, following the above logic and all other things being equal, those who benefit the 
most from bargains and are most willing to cooperate tends to be the member states with the 
smallest GDP. He also argues that these smallest countries put more significance in the marginal 
deals. This is due to the fact that these countries can place themselves in the slip winds of the larger 
economies and by that gain more in terms of economy (ibid: 200). The distinct advantages in import 
and export, in these smaller countries, determine their specific national interests within the 
interstate-bargaining. 
 
 As can be seen in the above paragraphs Liberal Intergovernmentalism focuses on the 
relationship amongst the member states themselves and also between the member states and the EU 
as such. When discussing these relationships it becomes relevant to discuss the reasoning behind 
engaging in international cooperation. To find a theoretical explanation for this choice one might 
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consider looking at the theory of rational choice. ”Rational choice theory sees social interaction as 
social exchange modelled on economic action. People are motivated by the rewards and costs of 
actions and by the profits that they can make.” (Scott in Browning, 2000: 2). One of the 
fundamentals of rational choice is the individual action, or the notion that individuals, and actors in 
general, do what they consider best for themselves (Andersen, 2005: 232). In this understanding the 
term actor can be understood not only as individuals, firms or organisations but also as states. In 
this case individuals band together into said organisations or nation states because they from their 
own rational experience see that thy, the individuals gain the most by joining the general 
community. The rational choice not only covers logical and economic considerations but also 
encompass emotional gains. If an individual for instance seeks religious gain, in the form of more 
churches for instance, or economic gains, being a higher pay check as an example, he or she may 
join a religious community or a labour union. This is because the individual rationally believe that 
he or she gains a higher salary or more churches by joining the group than by fighting on his or her 
own. 
 Some authors mention ”coalitional alternatives to agreements” (Cini in Cini & Borragán, 
2013: 80) which is when member states band together to work for one solution to an agreement. For 
instance if to member states strive to achieve to things that does not exclude or counteract each 
other the member states would form a coalition to strengthen their bargaining power. Seeing that 
most of the decisions on how a legal procedure is formed are decided in this bargaining round, the 
relative power of the European Council is constrained. This is due to the fact that the national 
bargaining often more or less defines how the national governments are to implement the laws. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the national governments enhance their own autonomy through this 
inter-state bargaining. When the existing member states required the new applicants to fulfil the 
Copenhagen criteria and comply with several unfavourable terms they had disadvantages in 
negotiations, since they contributed little economically. Membership in the EU meant institutional 
and structural changes outlined by the Copenhagen criteria for the applicants. The EU could dictate 
the terms of the enlargement because the candidates had more interest in joining than the Union had 
in enlarging. The economic benefits of the enlargement were much higher for the CEECs then for 
the EU, which gave them a less beneficial position in their negotiation and conclusively lead to 
them accepting the criteria from the EU relatively quickly. 
 This theory, especially the notion of individuals joining into groups and nation states, is 
somewhat related to the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. One can draw parallels to the 
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different parts in the theory, one of them being that organisations bands together within nation 
states. This is largely done to affect the outcome of the national policies and preferences which is as 
mentioned earlier important in Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Another relation between the two 
theories comes to mind namely in regards to the negotiation step between the member states of the 
EU. Rational Theorists would argue that within this step the member states determine their own 
negotiation position based on a rational choice. They would proceed in trying to evaluate how they 
as a state gain the most. In this sense the member states can be regarded as rational individuals. 
 The third step is the institutional delegation of the bargains made by the different member 
states. The point of institutions is to facilitate the bargaining and to make sure that every party of 
the bargaining commits to the end result. This correlates with Liberal Intergovernmentalism in the 
sense that it forces cooperation in the short run without constraining the national interests in the 
long run. 
 Some critical voices states state the Liberal Intergovernmentalism focus too much on the 
national interests without regarding international companies and the European institutions 
themselves. When analysing the ordinary legislative procedures, and empirical bases studies (ibid: 
81), it becomes clear that an institution like the Commission has a significant influence in regards to 
the formulation of the treaties and other laws passed within the EU. 
3 . 4  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  H i s t o r i c a l  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  
In the previous section Liberal Intergovernmentalism was elaborated on. What now follows is 
a section on Historical Institutionalism. This approach has quite another view on European 
integration than the previous theories. History, as the name implies, has a central place and thus 
scholars pertaining to Historical Institutionalism argue that it must be taken into account when 
analysing the EU, since history shapes the actions of agents which consequently is why actors do 
not behave solely rational. 
3 . 4 . 1  O r i g i n s  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  H i s t o r i c a l  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  
Historical institutionalism is an approach to studying politics with a long tradition, according 
to some it may even stem from the ancient Greek way of studying political institutions (Steinmo in 
Della Porta & Keatings, 2008: 151). Even though the term “Historical Institutionalism” did not 
appear until the 1990's many traditional scholar's work can be said to adhere to an approach similar 
to those claiming to be historical institutionalists (ibid: 157). To understand Historical 
Institutionalism it is important to understand where the modern tradition of it originates from as it 
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differentiates itself quite from other traditional approaches such as rational choice, structural 
functionalists etc. since it does not try to find a “law of politics” or be a grand theory capable of 
describing how all politics in all arenas work (ibid: 156). Historical Institutionalism has evolved 
from a very normative and descriptive approach trying to describe very identifiable structures in 
politics, administration and judicial systems with much focus on detailed comparisons of such 
systems between countries. This form of institutionalism did not allow for the development of 
explanatory theories and true comparative analysis of institutions (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 3). 
Newer Historical Institutionalism tries to identify how political battles “[...] are mediated by 
the institutional setting in which [they] take place.” (Ikenberry in Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 2). 
Historical institutionalists recognises the importance of the exogenous factors influencing the 
political struggles taking place within the institutions they examine and lay the focus on how the 
institutions affects the greater political struggles and outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 3). This 
approach was a result of the combination of firstly: post Second World War behaviouralist 
tendencies, where the emphasis was put on the more informal structures and power relations, this 
approach was very opposite to the previous normative traditions in that it was almost explicitly 
theoretical (ibid: 4). Secondly, the focus was yet again on institutions during the beginning of the 
1970's where scholars have attempted to introduce endogenous factors in their analysis of 
institutions, while still maintaining the original focus on the “real world” political outcomes and 
events (Steinmo in Della Porta & Keatings, 2008: 158) 
The modern or “new” Historical Institutionalism focus on the real world political outcomes 
and events, while still maintaining some behaviouralist theorising about endogenous factors. But 
what defines the institutions that are of such importance to the approach? One answer is presented 
by Steinmo as simply “rules” and he elaborates: 
“Whether we mean formal institutions or informal rules and norms, they are important for 
politics because they shape who participates in a given decision and, simultaneously, their strategic 
behaviour.” (ibid: 159). When studying those institutions a Hall argues that the focus should be put 
on what he defines as the “relational character” of institutions. Focusing on the relational character 
of an institution means that one should not consider power as a zero sum game with static 
structures, but instead the focus should be how the relations between institutions in different cases 
shape the outcome (Hall in Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 7).  
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3 . 4 . 2  D i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m s  
It is important to define and identify the difference between institutionalist approaches 
because they can appear quite similar, however differ in key points relevant to this project. And 
understanding these differences will help highlight why certain approaches, assumptions and 
emphasis' are made. 
The Rational Choice Institutionalism studies institutions with the assumption that all 
individual actors are acting to maximise self- interests and strategies. Historical Institutionalism 
does not deny that individual actors act to achieve their own goals or strategies, however opposite to 
rational choice the historical approach does not base these goals and strategies on assumptions of 
utility maximisation. Instead the historical institutionalist approach problematises what constitutes 
these preferences (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 9). The importance of endogenous preference shaping 
of the historical institutionalist approach means that institutions will not only act as the arena of 
preference (political) struggles but also the arena where preferences are shaped. This makes the 
institutions much more important than in rational choice institutionalism where the preferences are 
exogenously shaped and relatively fixed before entering the institution (ibid: 10-11).  
Indeed one might argue that Historical Institutionalism also have a lot in common with 
sociological approaches which is entirely true. In a sociological institutionalist approach the 
individual actors would be analysed as habitual and follow a “rule of appropriateness” meaning, 
that instead of asking “how do I benefit from this action” individuals tend to behave in an 
appropriate way constituted by societal or institutional norms and rules (Steinmo in Della Porta & 
Keatings, 2008: 162-163). Historical institutionalists accepts that human behaviour is sometimes 
constituted by norms and rules defined by exogenous factors, however differ in that they believe 
that sometimes decisions are also made on grounds of utility maximising and self- interest. When 
using a historical institutionalist approach one must then be concerned with why a certain decision 
was made and not as much with how it was a product of either rule/ norm following or self- interest 
maximisation (ibid: 163). 
3 . 4 . 3  W h y  H i s t o r y  M a t t e r s  
The historical context of a decision is the core of Historical Institutionalism. A decision is 
taking with regards to the history up to that decision, which would imply that historic events are not 
a series of independents, rather a chain of variables that can (and will) shape the preferences and 
decisions in future contexts (ibid: 166). It is argued that institutions can, through lock-ins, maintain 
their equilibrium even through radical exogenous changes. This effectively means that while the 
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political climate surrounding an institution may change over time, the institution can be “locked” in 
its function and thereby constrain the political development and policy making happening around it 
(Pollack in Jørgensen, 2006: 48). The institutions once created will act as a constraint on the actors 
involved which will make the historic development and evolution of the institution of great 
importance since it will reveal the constraints that the actors face when acting within the political 
arena. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was created to ensure the enforcement of the treaties of 
the original Coal and Steel Community (CSC). However as the CSC evolved into the EU and 
gained a wider set of competences, the ECJ remained and does now have jurisdiction over a much 
wider set of policy areas acting as a constraint on the member states of the EU when they make 
decisions (Kapsis in Cini & Borragan, 2013: 173).  
3 . 4 . 4  H o w  I n s t i t u t i o n s  E v o l v e  
To understand why the institutions can act as a constraint on the actors that originally founded 
the institution it is relevant to look at how an international or supranational institution can evolve 
independently of the states that created it. According to Pierson there exist four important factors 
that explain why institutions develop in diverging directions of the creators, the first being the 
partial autonomy of an institution (Pierson in Sangiovanni, 2006: 308). An institution is usually 
created to fulfil certain tasks that the creators wants to be delegated either to make the decisions of 
these tasks easier and/ or more effective and beneficial. To do this an institution must have a certain 
degree of resources and autonomy and expertise to carry out the delegated tasks. The level of 
autonomy, resources and expertise makes it possible for the institution to make decisions and act on 
its own within the framework given (ibid: 308-309). The creation of an institution will therefore 
create a new agent acting on the political scene which can develop its own interests diverging from 
the creators as the institution can be locked- in its function while the political climate that created it 
might change (Pollack in Jørgensen, 2006: 48-49; Pierson in Sangiovanni, 2006: 309).  
This leads to the second reason of institutional independent development, “The restricted time 
horizons of political decision makers” (Pierson in Sangiovanni, 2006: 311). Politicians will, 
according to Pierson, heavily discount the long term consequences and reforms in favour of short 
term gains because their power is dependent on rather frequent elections. The long term gains are 
therefore often by- products of the short term actions. This focus on short term gains are of course 
only if the politicians fear a short term electoral “backfire” or if they know that they cannot benefit 
from the long term consequences of a long term action. As argued before, according to historical 
institutionalists, politicians do not only maximise self- interests, and are of course capable of taking 
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long term decisions, however these will be discounted on the premises that have just been presented 
(ibid: 312-13). The inherent focus on short term electoral gains or losses of politicians, mean that 
they are less likely to care about smaller institutional developments that might have consequences in 
the long run (ibid).  
In a large institution like the EU this will create gaps in the member state control of the 
institution which can lead to the third reason for independent institutional development unintended 
consequences.  The sometimes complex processes of an institution will be easier to navigate 
through by actors inside the institution compared to politicians entering the institution for shorter 
periods only. As institutions have their own goals and strategies according to historical 
institutionalists, the actors within the institution will have an easier time out manoeuvring the 
politicians (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 14). Unintended consequences might also occur when as the 
complexity of issues that an institution deals with grows. In the EU this means that member state 
scrutiny of laws and decision become ever more difficult. The ability to scrutinise the larger 
intergovernmental agreements will be heavily scrutinised whereas the smaller day to day decisions 
less so. This leaves room for the institution to exploit the sometimes incomplete framework given 
by the larger agreements, to develop towards its own ideas and goals leading to unintended 
consequences for those who created the agreements (Pierson in Sangiovanni, 2006: 313-314). 
Lastly changes in Chiefs of Government further leads to gaps in member states’ control of an 
institution in that new member state governments have their own goals and ideas of the function of 
an institution and might neglect areas that were emphasised by previous governments. These 
preferences also change over time as national party constellations etc evolve and chiefs of 
government are faced with new political climates (ibid: 316). New chiefs of government do, 
according to historical institutionalists learn from the predecessors and will therefore be able to 
close some of the gaps of control created, however as the gaps are usually created by several 
member states that all have shifting governments with different priorities and preferences closing 
those gaps will require a lot of political capital and attention which might not be favourable with the 
often short term thinking politicians (ibid: 316-17). This makes institutions very sticky and resistant 
to major reformation without the willingness of the institution itself. 
3 . 4 . 5  H i s t o r i c a l  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ’ s  R e l e v a n c e  i n  S t u d i e s  o f  t h e  
E U  
Jupille and Caporaso wrote in their 1999 annual review in political science that“[…]institutionalism 
has permeated the study of the EU, replacing older, and less fruitful, ad hoc approaches.”(Jupille & 
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Caporaso ,1999: 437). And with the EU being one of the worlds most institutionalised institutions 
many of the institutionalist theories, including historic institutionalism, have developed around or 
applied to a large extend to the EU (Pollack in Wiener & Diez, 2004: 137). It is argued that the 
Historical Institutionalist approach to studying the EU will generate a more comprehensive 
understanding of the EU than both rational choice and constructivist approaches because it is based 
on the discoveries of both, married with the historic facts and focus on why the action was taken 
more than the how (Pollack in Jørgensen 2006, 50; Steinmo in Della Porta & Keatings, 2008: 163). 
 
 
3 . 5  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  C o n s t r u c t i v i s m  
The project has now elaborated on different major approaches to European integration. In the 
following, yet another view on integration will be presented, namely that of Constructivism. 
Constructivism differs especially from Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism in 
the sense that it is not a grand theory able to account for the whole of European Integration. It 
furthermore disagrees completely with the perceived narrow conception that actors behave 
rationally. In Constructivism, it is acknowledged that rational behavior can serve as the explanation 
for a certain decision, but other factors certainly also may come into play. In this sense it agrees to 
some extent with Historical Institutionalism. It may also be argued that Constructivism agree to 
some extent with Neofunctionalism in that both state that agents become influenced by working in 
the European Institutions and thus will begin to identify increasingly with the project. 
 
3 . 5 . 1  C o n s t r u c t i v i s m  
  Constructivism differs from the established integration theories in the sense that 
Constructivism is not per se a theory of European integration. As of now Constructivism does not 
provide a comprehensive enough framework and methodology to be defined as a theory of 
integration (Rosamund in Cini & Borragán, 2012). However, it definitely has it merits as will be 
seen. 
  Constructivism is best described as an ontology; A way to perceive the world. 
Constructivism is thus compatible with the theories of European integration and different authors 
argue that it in this way should not be regarded as being opposed to for example Neofunctionalism 
or Liberal Intergovernmentalism, but rather complement them (Christiansen, Jørgensen & Wiener, 
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1999). Constructivism has proven useful in combination with Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
thus produced a productive ‘dialogue’ according to Richardson (2006: 92). Some authors states that 
Constructivism does not necessarily disagree with the whole liberal intergovernmentalist theory of 
integration, but with its ontology, namely that of rational choice (Risse & Wiener, 1999). To 
confuse things even more, influential authors like Checkel and Parsons believe that rational choice 
and constructivism are indeed compatible (cited in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2003: 398) and work 
following this argument has sought a synthesis of the two, arguing that they apply in different 
domains rather than contradict each other (ibid: 398). This means that the rationalist perspective 
may apply as the cause for countries to engage in negotiation on a certain subject in the European 
Union, but in the negotiation itself more nuances come to the fore and thus the constructivist 
perspective may apply. Also following this argument, is the view that not even the different theories 
of European integration and constructivism are incompatible, but rather enables scholars to account 
for sectoral, vertical and horisontal integration (Richardson, 2006: 92), which implies that when 
utilising different theories and perspectives of European integration, one is able to grasp a bigger 
picture, than the theories in themselves can account for. This point is consistent with this project’s 
overall goal, namely to create a nuanced answer to the problem formulation and not making one 
theory prevail over the others. 
  When working with Constructivism some authors believe that the outcome should focus on 
‘social ontologies and social institutions, directing research at the origin and reconstruction of 
identities, the impact of rules and norms, the role of language and political discourse’ (Rosamund 
in Cini & Borragán: 94). 
  This makes Constructivism stand out from the established theories of European integration. 
To constructivists the world is not simple and it is thus argued that especially rules, norms and 
identities are crucial when trying to understand such a complex concept as the European Union. To 
understand why this is so very important, it is first necessary to know how exactly constructivists 
think of actors and institutions. A mapping out of the constructivist ontology is thus needed. 
  As previously stated, constructivism is perhaps best seen as an ontology or a meta-theory 
when compared to the theories of integration. What makes the constructivist ontology so utterly 
different from for example the liberal intergovernmentalist, is its logic of appropriateness – its 
rationale contained in its ontology. The logic of appropriateness is described by March & Olsen 
(cited in Saurugger, 2013: 891) as being: 
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“[…] a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or 
exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are 
seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations 
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, 
and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions.” 
  This specific logic is thus concerned with how agents act in accordance with their identity 
constituted by the norms and ideas that have been internalised and is therefore also in stark contrast 
to the logic of consequentialism that rational choice is funded upon; Namely that the action of 
agents is based on maximising one’s own interests and preferences (ibid). In this way 
constructivists are able to account for ambiguous behavior that may transcend the rational choice 
explanation, in that actors according to constructivists act on behalf of what they think is 
appropriate. This is the reason Thomas Risse (cited in Christensen, Jørgensen & Wiener, 1999) has 
argued that Constructivism can subsume rationalist approaches as its ontology is both broader and 
deeper than the rationalist. The argument here is that the only explanation rationalist approaches 
acknowledge is causal explanation, which leaves out others such as identity, community and 
collective intentionality, that is, the nuances. (ibid: 553) 
  In Constructivism, institutions are rules and norms. Institutions and actors reproduce each 
other. Actors do this by establishing rules and norms and at the same time succumbing to the same 
rules and norms which they have created - thus perpetuating them. Consequently, no one of these 
elements exists without the other and institutions do therefore not prevail over actors. Institutions 
are thus products of actors, but since actors succumb to institutional influence, institutions and 
agents constitute each other. This process is called the mutual constitutive effect. Here one may 
draw on the classical definitions of Constructivism; namely Berger & Luckmann’s to whom 
Constructivism “[…] refers to the assumption that social norms and frameworks on which reality is 
based are constructed and redefined through permanent interaction” (1966 cited in in Saurugger, 
2013: 890). 
  What are redefined through permanent interaction are the rules and norms which constitute 
institutions. Norms are to constructivists understood as “collective expectations for the proper 
behavior of actors with a given identity” (Rosamund in Cini & Borragán, 2012: 94). Thus, it can be 
seen as a sort of framework of behavior – hence institutions. Rules and norms may not explicitly be 
expressed, but may present themselves as a common understanding or a way to do things 
(Christensen, Jørgensen & Wiener, 1999: 539). This may for example be the procedures inherent in 
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the different EU institutions, procedures that are not written down, but which one will learn during a 
period of work. Another example is the fact that people normally spoken of as ‘civilised’ (whoever 
they are) in the western countries, as a rule does not use their fingers for eating during dinner, but 
cutlery. This is a perfect example of an institution constituted by rules and norms being perpetuated 
by ‘proper’ upbringing. If one looks against the eastern countries, one may find other ways to bring 
food from plate to mouth (if a plate is at all utilised) and again if one looks to the southern countries 
one may once more find differences. Looking at different countries in a certain region complicates 
things even further. 
This is also a brilliant example of how the constructivists see the world. The world to 
constructivists, or at least the knowledge one can gather from the world, is constructed, thus the 
culture we grow up in and the manners inherent in it are not rigid and may be changed over time, 
and as the examples above illustrate they may differ profoundly from each other (Zeev, 1995 in  
ibid: 531). So when analysing the European Union with Constructivism one needs to take account 
also for these unspoken rules and norms in order to grasp the big picture. Thus, Constructivism 
provides a more intricate analysis of that which influences agent’s behavior. 
  Actors acquire their identities through internalisation of norms, thus not even identities are 
fixed in the view of Constructivism (Rosamund in Cini & Borragán: 94), and this is one of the 
major differences from the theories of integration previously described and also a crucial fact to be 
aware of when dealing with constructivism. Thus, Richardson (2006: 90), theorises that the 
willingness of actors to further integrate in the European Union is determined by the degree to 
which they identify with the whole project. Strictly speaking, have they not internalised norms that 
favour the European Union, they will not act in accordance with further integration, but may even 
work against it. 
  However, much like arguments from the neofunctionalist camp, constructivists believe in a 
transformative effect in regards of the process of integration (ibid). This simply means that agents 
working in the European Union institutions will begin to internalise norms further from their 
domestic counterparts and will identify increasingly with the European Union. Thus, according to 
Constructivism they will end up with not only a domestic identity, but also a European one (ibid). 
This specific way of internalising norms is known as socialisation and in this way actors may now 
weigh their actions against what is appropriate considering both their identities and not necessarily 
against what is rational. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
T h e  O p e n  M e t h o d  o f  
C o o r d i n a t i o n  
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  O p e n  M e t h o d  o f  C o o r d i n a t i o n  
The following section concerns itself with the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a 
method that has been introduced as one of the new modes of governance adopted by the EU with 
the Lisbon strategy in 2000. It is the major official decision making process used to develop the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) and this section will thus facilitate an understanding of it. 
This chapter is dedicated to explain the emergence of the OMC, its basic process and finally 
its relation to the EES. 
4 . 2  T h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  O p e n  M e t h o d  o f  C o o r d i n a t i o n  
The OMC was established as a pillar of the Lisbon strategy in 2000, where the purpose was to 
grant the member states a strategy based on guiding and coordinating principles. This strategy 
would help to ensure that member states reach the ‘main goals of the EU’ within a given time 
frame, but through a more smooth and coordinated practise than utilised earlier, as with for example 
the economic integration in the 90’s where the policy practise reduced the member states’ options in 
the field of employment policy. This lead the member states to become more reluctant to delegate 
powers to the EU (Eurofond, 2010). 
Although the OMC first appeared in the Lisbon strategy in 2000, it is important to understand 
that it had been under way for a long time. Many policies prior to this summit had already been the 
object of coordination. Examples are national economic policies under the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) as well the EES (Raedelli, 2003: 17). 
The OMC was in some sense already an established method and all the Lisbon strategy did 
was to bring together these ‘scattered’ policy practises under the banner of OMC. Thus, in this way 
the creation of the OMC brought political coherence to already existing practises. The method did 
however also add a new policy area, namely education, in which there was no existing practices. 
(ibid, 16-18; Lodge, 2007: 345-346). 
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The emergence of the OMC was by many scholars considered necessary to coordinate the 
European social policies. Economic policy practises had already been subject to coordination before 
entering formal cooperation in the Maastricht Treaty and the EMU. Social policies thus came to 
follow this sort of coordination process (Lodge, 2007: 345). 
The Lisbon strategy marks a very important starting point for the OMC. It was through the 
Lisbon strategy that the OMC became legitimised as a decision making procedure for future 
European policy practises. It is important to recognise the overall goals of the Lisbon strategy, as 
these goals essentially are what were represented and later implemented through the OMC.  
The Lisbon strategy’s focus was to promote social inclusion while bettering the EU’s long term 
competitiveness. The challenge was ultimately to make the EU: 
“[…] the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Presidency 
Conclusions cited in Radaelli, 2003: 19). 
This strategy sets two ultimate goals for the Union: Firstly, to enhance the European 
competitiveness and secondly to establish a European mode for social protection, whilst living up to 
expectations of economic growth and social cohesion. Thus, under the Lisbon strategy two issue 
areas unfolds. They fall under the sub-categories of either ‘competitiveness-fostering policies’ or 
‘welfare-fostering policies’ (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2007: 189-190). This divides the policies into 
branches of information society, enterprise policy internal market policy and macro-economic 
policy on the one hand, and social investment, education policy, employment policy and policies 
against social inclusion on the other (ibid: 190). 
Although the Lisbon strategy addresses issues of both competitiveness as well as social 
inclusion, it does not seek to deal with them as separated unconnected policy areas. Instead, these 
policy areas are considered dependent on one another and policies have to be merged, in order to 
achieve an optimal result.  This was explained by a ‘new’ consensus that emerged during the mid-
1990’s. This consensus recognised that the previous ‘efficiency-improving economic strategies’ 
were important for competitiveness, but not sufficient enough by themselves to foster better 
competitiveness. 
It was perceived that in order to foster the most competitiveness, member states had to focus 
on both economic and social policies to create the best criteria. This is why it was perceived 
beneficiary and only natural by some scholars if the EU were to reach a common social policy, as 
economic policies already were subject to coordination. However, advocates for a common social 
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policy would have to do with the ‘next best’ solution as the EU lacks the competences to act on this 
area and this is where the OMC was applied as the main instrument to coordinate social policies. 
(Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012: 9-14). 
Thus, the OMC would enable countries to coordinate social policies, and achieve best 
practises through a non-binding set of policy goals. However, as the OMC only integrates a non-
binding set of obligations, it is just perceived as a method to get as close as possible to a common 
social policy instrument, in order to foster better competitiveness and thereby reach ‘the goal’ of the 
strategy and the EU (Idema & Keleman, 2007: 114-115). 
Moving to a point of social cohesion across the union is though considered a politically 
impossibility as the EU lack the competences needed to utilise Community Method in this area. In 
addition critics argue that even if the EU had the competences to apply Community Method in this 
area, a common social policy would challenge each unique welfare structure of the member states 
(Borrás & Jacobsson, 2007: 190). 
4 . 2 . 1  B e s t  P r a c t i s e  
The OMC concerns itself with developing the best conditions possible for member states to 
achieve ‘best practises’ through coordination. 
Best practise is something, which adheres to a method that consistently has shown results 
superior to other methods dealing with problems in the same area.  
In terms of dealing with specific sensitive policy areas, such as social policy, where member 
states still retain sovereignty, the OMC is considered most effective in reaching the main goals of 
the EU. This, of course, is not very specific and various national leaders might have a different 
interpretation of what the main goals of the EU are (Radaelli, 2007: 13-15). Although different 
leaders’ interpretation might differ across various policy areas, the OMC design will help in 
clarifying a set of specific policy goals that all the member states can agree upon. This section will 
describe the basic process of the OMC as a four-step model. 
The first step involves the Council to agree on a non-binding set of common objectives for the 
member states. 
The next step is for the national governments to make an action plan, with the purpose of 
translating the common objectives, set by the Council into national and regional policies. 
The third step is to agree upon specific benchmarks and indicators, in order to measure best 
practise.  
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The fourth and last step is for the Commission to monitor and evaluate the results of every 
member state. Prior to 2005, the national plans were discussed amongst representatives from other 
countries for peer review. It was only after 2005 the Commission overtook the supervising role 
(Eurofond, 2010; Morel, Palier & Palme: 2012: 338). The initial thought was that through peer 
pressure, all member states would commit to the goals agreed upon by the Council. The 
participation through this process would reflect upon the country, thus, if a member state were not 
to comply with the initial agreement, it would have reflect on this member state through naming, 
shaming and faming. 
The OMC differs from traditional soft law as it is based on a more intergovernmental 
approach; the Council and the Commission have a dominant role, where as traditional soft law has a 
more supranational approach, here the dominant role is shared by the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2007: 188). 
The OMC is subject to a high level of political participation, as the first step consists of the 
input from each member state going through the Council, with the last step being the Commission 
administrating the monitoring phase. In contrast, other soft law methods utilise a peer review 
process, while an administrative office typically manages the monitoring phase.  
The purpose of a high political involvement is to achieve a mutual commitment with the 
formulation process and to add a peer pressure mechanism for the monitoring process (ibid: 188-
189) 
The OMC explicitly seeks to further interlink domestic policy-making and cooperation at the 
EU level, to combine common action while preserving national autonomy. The purpose for the 
OMC is “[…] to integrate action at various levels of governance; this opens up the possibility for 
truly bottom-up political dynamics…” (ibid: 189). 
This enables participation from a wide range of actors - public as well as private. The idea is 
to foster networking and cooperative practices, through a high participation rate amongst multiple 
actors. Open participatory aspects have been largely absent in other soft law methods within the 
EU, instead, legislators have preferred a more top-down approach where member states could to a 
larger extent be held accountable to the European Court of Justice (ibid: 189-190; López-Santana, 
2006: 485). 
It is important to understand that the OMC’s features vary from policy to policy. Although the 
basic design is quite simplistic, the actual policy coordination is a detailed formula, which varies 
considerable across policy areas. The OMC is to be understood as:  
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“[…] not some kind of fixed recipe that can be applied to any issue […] Policy co-ordination 
and open co-ordination together constitute a cookbook that contains varies recipes, lighter and 
heavier ones” (Vandenbrouke, 2002: 9 cited in Raedelli, 2003: 18). In this sense, the chosen policy 
area, EES, is not to be directly compared to other policy practises under the influence of the OMC 
as during the first step the Commission proposes the initial goals to be agreed upon by the Council. 
4 . 2 . 2  C r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  O p e n  M e t h o d  o f  C o o r d i n a t i o n  
One of the more fundamental critiques of the OMC is the argument that there is no 
consequence if a member state does not comply with the action plan made. It is thus just an inter-
governmental procedure, supported by the commission (Morel, Palier, Palme, 2012: 338). This is 
also referred to as the accountability problem of the OMC. In contrast to the traditional Community 
Method, where the Parliament and the European Court of Justice is central to the law making and 
implementation process, the OMC is based on soft law, and therefore has no institution to make 
sure the initial agreement is met. Instead, the only consequence from not following the goals in the 
OMC is a ‘bad reputation’. 
The OMC can be considered a method to gain influence in areas where the EU has no legal 
competences. New modes of governance will not be applied on areas where the EU has been 
delegated competences. In these areas the EU will rely on judicial enforcement of strict legal norms 
such as the Community Method.  In this sense the OMC is merely a strategic method for policy 
makers who would like to see the EU play a bigger role within the social policy sphere (Idema & 
Keleman, 2007: 110). 
Advocates of this find themselves detained by the EU’s lack of competences to regulate 
within this area. Instead of proposing a non-binding set of objectives through soft law such as the 
OMC, these policy makers would like to implement binding EU law in this area via the traditional 
community method, which would enable the EU to ‘create’ a powerful ‘social Europe’ (Idema & 
Keleman, 2007: 110-115). 
Opponents of a ‘social Europe’ though, have no problem with the OMC in this regard, as they 
perceive OMC as a rather insignificant and innocuous process with no binding objectives, thereby 
leaving competences with the member states. That the OMC have little to no effect is supported by 
the argument, that the OMC remains a rather bureaucratic enterprise and ”[…] its potential as a 
reflexive learning strategy is neither appreciated nor realised” (ibid: 110). This implies that the 
OMC according to these authors works as a reporting process rather than an agenda-setting plan for 
member states. The OMC is thus used in areas where it harmonises with a member states’ domestic 
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policy priorities, typically competitiveness and employment, but falls short in areas where it 
conflicts with these same priorities, typically social inclusion) (ibid). 
Another critique of the OMC is that it is just another policy forum for discussing social 
policy. The point is that there is hardly a short supply on information about social policy, with 
policy think tanks, academic journals and newspapers like the Financial Times or the Economist. 
Thus, an additional forum also aimed at discussing issues of social policy is unlikely to provide any 
country with significant policy changes. 
“Given the rather limited participation in the OMC by national policy makers and given the 
wide supply of other sources of learning, the OMC is likely to play only a marginal role in the 
overall policy learning.” (ibid: 115). 
If the objective is to enable member states with more and better options for creating best 
practises, the OMC becomes redundant due to these policy fora already existing. 
It is important to recognise that the Lisbon strategy addresses both issues of competitiveness 
and social cohesion, but not as separated unconnected policy areas.  
During the 1990’s a consensus seemed to emerge that while previous ‘efficiency-improving 
economic strategies’ were important for competitiveness, they were not sufficient enough to foster 
competitiveness by themselves. 
4 . 3  H i s t o r i c a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  E E S  
The following section will introduce the EES as a specific case that has been through the 
OMC process. 
Before explaining the historical development of EES it is important to distinguish the Lisbon 
strategy from the EES. The Lisbon strategy can be seen as an overall agenda setting strategy, set to 
reach a goal by utilising soft law, while the EES is direct policy practise working with more 
concrete challenges within its respective area, it still follows the guidelines set by the Lisbon 
strategy. Thus, the EES falls under the umbrella of the Lisbon strategy, making the goals of the EES 
from 2000, the same as the ones of the Lisbon strategy.  
However, the story of the EES did not start with the Lisbon strategy in 2000. Instead, the EES 
was established on basis of the Delors White Paper on growth as a reaction to economic difficulties 
in Europe in the beginning of 1990’s (Europa, 2005a). Already from before the emergence of the 
Delors White Paper, social policy was subject to coordination, although at first this cooperation was 
seen through other institutions than the EU, and was thus not formalised in EU legislation.  
Although the economic situation of the EU was improving, the labour market demanded further 
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focus on new skill-sets in the service and IT sector. In addition, predictions of demographic 
problems and an uneven economic development within the EU, served as the foundation for what 
would lead to a common European employment strategy. The first steps towards a formalised 
European employment strategy were taken in Essen in 1995, also known as the Essen strategy 
(ibid). 
The Essen strategy did not seek to produce EU legislation on the areas concerned. However, it 
did set up formal goals and objectives for the employment policies of the Union. These recognised 
the challenges previously identified in the Delors White Paper, thus policy makers tried to 
incorporate them in a system of soft law instead of introducing them in the traditional Community 
Method. This was done due to the lack of competences within these areas in the EU. Instead, the 
formal outcome of the Essen strategy of 1995 was an internal source of communication on trends on 
the labour market, resulting in the Commission's decision to set up a labour market committee in 
1996 (ibid; Idema & Keleman, 2007: 110). 
Eventually the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 introduced a chapter on employment in the treaties 
that led the commission to start the process of making a common employment strategy the EES 
(Europa, 2005a). 
The strategy was developed before the Amsterdam treaty was ratified and relied on the 
chapter on employment to be incorporated. It was based on the same guiding and coordination 
principle that was adopted with the Essen strategy.  Included in the strategy were more formalised 
goals on employment policies in the Union within four “pillars” namely: Employability, 
entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities (ibid). In short, the common goals were to 
reduce long term unemployment by providing the possibility for re-education and up-skilling of the 
workforce, transparent rules to make it easier for small and medium sized enterprises to start up, 
establishing a flexible labour market that could adapt to new requirements fast and lastly to give 
increased opportunities for women on the labour market through parental leave systems and part 
time job possibilities. The intentions were that the EES would help to ensure ‘more and better’ jobs 
for Europeans and through these objectives, ensure an economic future for the EU (ibid; Morel, 
Palier & Palme, 2012: 205-208).  
The policy process developed at the Amsterdam summit would lay the foundation for the 
basic process of the OMC. This process included the Commission to survey progress in the 
individual member states and the Council would create country specific recommendations whereas 
the individual member states would create action plans to meet the recommendations (ibid). 
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The “Lisbon Special European Council” in 2000 elaborated on the foundation of the EES by 
recognising the future problems of the EU along with debating how to exploit the possibilities of 
the euro and the recovering economies. At the meeting the Commission agreed to work on 
strategies towards making a EU that was more competitive when compared to rapidly developing 
foreign economies by emphasising entrepreneurship, IT and education of the work force to meet the 
future demands of the labour market. It was further agreed that social integration should play a role 
in the future of the EU to try to combat the changing demographics by promoting social cohesion 
(Europa, 2005b). 
With these changes in 2000, the EES would now be introduced in the process of the OMC. As 
the strategy had already been the subject to coordination it did not mean much in terms of the 
strategy itself. However, the overall goals were reworked to include more objectives as well 
(Raedeli, 2003: 14-15). 
The mid-term review of the EES in 2002 reflected the themes debated at the Lisbon Special 
European Council in 2000. The overall assessment of the EES by the Commission was that there 
had been improvement on all of the four key areas in the years from 1997 to 2001 (Europa, 2005c). 
However, it was agreed to improve on dealing with medium-term challenges, especially those 
debated in 2000, the changing demographics towards an older workforce and the flexibility of the 
labour market to adopt to new jobs and skill-sets. Furthermore, the recommendations for the 
national action plans were to be simplified, but keep their wide perspective. Lastly, the Commission 
agreed to include more of the stake- holders in the EES process and improve the consistency of the 
progress in the different member states (ibid). 
In 2005, the Commission reviewed the EES and the conclusion was that the strategy, insofar, 
had been ineffective in reaching the goals set in the Lisbon Strategy (Europa, 2008; Mailand, 2008: 
187; Devetzi, 2009: 38). The peer pressure and ranking model of ‘naming, shaming and faming’ 
had been insufficient in ensuring EES’s goals of 2000 (Devetzi, 2009: 39). Authors like Mailand 
argues that the development of the EES had come to a halt, with member states showing a lack of 
faith in the OMC process as a policy creation tool (2008: 187-191). 
The Commission intended for the strategy to develop in a more specific way with 
recommended action, instead of recommended targets and goals, both for the strategy as a whole 
but also to be implemented in the national recommendations.  
The rework of the strategy was deemed necessary in order for the policy process to continue 
and restart the EES’s development process. The observation process would no longer be practiced 
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by the member states as a method of peer pressure, but would instead by adopted by the 
Commission. In addition, guidelines were to be simplified and focus should be put on delivering 
stronger, lasting growth and more and better jobs (Devetzi, 2009: 38; Europa, 2008).  
After 2005, the role and goals of the EES needed a rework in order for the policy process to 
continue. The development of the process had to be restored and so the observation process was 
changed and described earlier. The rework of the EES would now entitle the strategy to have a 
focus on security and flexibility. Though this was not a completely new objective for the EES, as 
these goals had been implemented in 2004 to ensure previous unmet challenges for the member 
states. These goals stressed the importance of adaptability and flexibility and draw particular 
attention to ‘best practises’ in Denmark and Netherlands for creating an optimal balance between 
flexibility and security (Morel, Palier and Palme, 2012: 46-48; Devetzi, 2009: 37). The same 
taskforce who had developed these plans also stated in their report ‘Facing the Challenge’, that the 
reason for its existence was due to: “([…] the underperformance of national policies in respect to 
the Lisbon targets.” (Devetzi, 2009: 37-38). 
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C h a p t e r  5  
A n a l y s i s  
5 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In the following sections the four theoretical approaches to European Integration will be 
utilised separately in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the reasons behind the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). 
5 . 2  N e o f u n c t i o n a l i s t  A n a l y s i s  
When looking at the OMC and the European Employment Strategy (EES) through the 
perspective of Neofunctionalism one of the first things that may come to mind is the concept of 
spillover, more specifically the notion of functional spillover. Finding the reasoning behind the 
background of the EES, and thus the OMC, becomes relatively simple with this concept in mind. 
One needs only to look at the expansion of European economic integration through the 1990's and 
especially the fast growth of the internal market as well as the introduction of the monetary union 
(Devetzi, 2009: 32). This development was followed by the advent of the EES and the OMC, and 
thus the spillover argument of Neofunctioalism comes into play.  As previously explained, 
functional spillover describes a situation where, in order to improve one area of cooperation, 
another area of cooperation has to be further developed (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 63). In 
this particular case the increased cooperation on the internal market and the European Monetary 
Union left the member states lacking social integration to make the cooperation work at its most 
optimal (Devetzi, 2009: 31). This called for the need of an ability to regulate and indeed further 
monitor employment policies and the labour market as such. 
 A set of different areas, the so-called pillars of the EES, were developed into components of 
this employment strategy in order to actually increase the positive effects of the economic 
integration. As an example the pillar of ”equal opportunities” could be mentioned as a 
spillovereffect of the improved economic area. This concept of equal opportunities was meant to 
secure equal rights to women on the labour market. This included, amongst other things, policies on 
maternal leave (Europa, 2005a). This can be seen as a positive functional spillover-effect due to the 
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fact that it was deemed necessary to regulate the area in order to make the EU more competitive 
(ibid). 
 Furthermore, the development of the OMC can be seen as political spillover as the 
Commission with the OMC is given a chance to provide guidelines and suggestions as to how the 
member states improve their social policies (Nielson & Svensson, 2000). This gives the 
Commission, though to a limited extent, some political influence which is utilised through the 
officials within the Commission working the given policy areas (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 
63). This will further strengthen the regional cooperation and theoretically lead to the possibilities 
of further integration in other areas as well. 
 It can also be argued that the spillover into the EES and the OMC will create a need for 
further regulation in the economic sector. This is due to the fact that the increase in social 
integration will lead to more possibilities in the economic sector. Thus, the EES and the OMC will 
create the foundation for further development in these economic policies. 
  A neofunctionalist view on the Commission would mention elite socialisation. In 
this argumentation the theory focuses both on the officials that produces the guidelines for the 
Commission as well as the officials that, in working for the national ministries, look through these 
said recommendations. Firstly, if one focuses on the role of the Commission, the officials employed 
here will often be based in Brussels and often consist of individuals from several different member 
states. Neofunctionalism would predict that policies in the area of the EES would be formed with 
the EU in general, and not individual member states, in mind. This will further the integration 
proces of the EES in the sense that the policies will be influenced towards creating an improved 
european market. As an example the pillar of adaptability can be mentioned as it specifically seeks 
to ease the transition of social policies (Europe, 2005a). Here the officials would sit with the task of 
improving the state aid policies over the entire European spectre rather than in a single country. 
Neofunctionalism argues that the socialisation that happens between the officials would drive them 
towards focusing on the entire union rather than their home country as explained by “[t]he 
Commission propos[ing] that this could, among other things, be done by removing financial 
barriers on work related aid policies which would make it easier to upskill workers and thus 
diminish unemployment rates. (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 64). 
 Secondly, one can also focus on the officials that work in the national ministries and through 
their position works with the EES and the implementation of the guidelines into national legislation. 
They will, according the theory, be introduced to the aspects of the EES and will, especially if the 
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policies proves to be successful, come to adopt the mind-set of the officials working in the EU. 
Thus, through this elite socialisation the agendas and mind-sets of the EES guidelines will be 
promoted generally via the two different sets of officials. This will further promote the integration 
of the social policies of the EES and the OMC due to these officials graduately adapting to the 
working methods of the OMC.  
 Furthermore, it should be noticed that there, following this argumentation, can be seen a 
relative importance between the way the officials socialise and the way that politicians themselves 
react both amongst each other and towards the officials. The argument here is based on the fact that 
politicians are elected for a limited amount of time and that they are therefore not as affected by 
socialisation as the ordinary officials are. The politicians may see the short term effects of the 
policies as well as actually only thinking in the short run. This is due to the fact that they may 
arguably only have limited concern with what happens after their election period is over. When the 
election period expires it often happens that a new set of politicians is inaugurated. This means that 
a new set of politicians has to be socialised. This is happening parallel to the fact that the change in 
officials does not happen as often as it does with the politicians. This results in officials becoming 
more socialised and adapted to the political system than the politicians. This will inevitably slow 
down the general socialisation process seeing that every time a new set of politicians enter the 
political scene they will have to be re-socialised. 
 As argued above the economic sphere of the Single Market and the European Monetary 
Union for instance, is closely related to the sphere of social policy, including the EES. Thus it 
becomes relevant to discuss whether or not this economic sphere can be considered a success in the 
view of Neofunctionalism. It is here relevant to note that economic integration is not to be 
considered as a zero sum game where if one country achieves an economic gain one or more other 
countries must go through the equivalent deficits in order to reach a total sum of zero (Haas, 1964: 
58). It is noted by Haas that through economic integration all member states are in a situation where 
they can benefit at the same time (ibid). It would thus be argued that the Single Market Act for 
instance can lead, and have lead, to a greater economic outcome for the EU. 
 In regards to discussing whether or not a European-wide coordination of social policies, 
such as the EES, is a success the theoretical approach of Neofunctionalism would take a rather 
positive position. The reasoning behind this statement is, among other places, to be found in the 
notion that supranational institutions gain a lot of influence. The important point to look at here is 
these institutions not looking particularly at the needs of a single member state, but rather at the 
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needs and wants of the EU in general (Jensen in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 62). This focus on the 
entire union provides benefits in a broader spectrum which will lead to a higher positive gain for 
each country. This positive gain would, in a matter of total sum, be higher than should the countries 
have managed their social policies individually. This means that if one were to look at what the 
member states would have gained had they worked separately and made a total sum of their gains, 
this total sum would be weaker than the total sum achieved of working together in a cooperation 
such as the EES. 
 When looking at the total sum gained from the increased cooperation introduced through the 
OMC and the EES the logic of Neofunctionalism would perhaps state that through functional 
spillover it would in time turn into a Community Method (ibid). This is due to the idea that member 
states would firstly see the gains from cooperation and thus seek to extend said cooperation. 
Secondly an increased cooperation would demand a more intricate framework for maintaining the 
deals made. This would place more responsibility on the shoulders of the european institutions, 
such as the Commission.  
5 . 2 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
 To sum up the analysis of Neofunctionalism it can be said that the theory would emphasize 
the benefits of both the OMC in general and the EES specifically. It would though be argued that 
the OMC is merely a part of the way and should not be considered the end result of integration. As 
argued the term of elite socialisation would over time lead to even more integration. This would be 
done when officials and politicians become more accustomed to the European system. Furthermore 
positive spillover-effects would create a need for further integration in more and more policy areas. 
This would this cause the integration to spread into these other areas. Through the spillover effect it 
is also argued that the OMC may develop into more of a Community Method to the increased size 
of the framework required to maintain the expanding deals made between the member states. 
 
 
5 . 3  L i b e r a l  I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s t  A n a l y s i s  
When one looks at the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) one sees that it tries to establish 
a balance of responsibility between the community and the member states themselves (Europe, 
2005a). Seen from a liberal intergovernmentalist point of view this is an attempt from the member 
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states to keep themselves in charge of the situation (Cini in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 80). According 
to the Liberal Intergovernmentalist logic the OMC should be seen as a result of interstate-
bargaining between the member states. This is due to the idea that the aspect of coordination within 
the OMC allows the states to relatively freely coordinate and plan their own employment strategies. 
Both the Commission and the Council functions as mediators in this situation, and thus does not 
directly constrain the member states’ possible courses of action (ibid).  
This increased manoeuvrability of the member states is further underlined by the nature of the 
suggestions given by the Council. In many different aspects of employment strategies the Council 
only sets recommendation on certain areas (Europe, 2005a). From this, there could be drawn two 
major conclusions in regards to the relation between the OMC and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, the notion that the Council only work as a mediator with the primary 
purpose of providing guidelines rather than creating hard law that has to be followed, As an 
example of the Commission working as a mediator can the Lisbon summit be mentioned. The 
Commission had suggested lowering unemployment rates to the recommended levels of about four 
percent by 2010. The state leaders had in this case pushed the suggested dates further into the future 
which indicates a watering down of the Commissions influence (Nielsen & Svensson, 2000). 
Secondly, it becomes relevant to discuss the relative bargaining power between the member 
states. As the guidelines of the Council, in regards to the OMC, is not ultimately binding it is on a 
practical level arguably more in the hands of the member states to decide the appropriate course of 
action. This means that the national preferences in regards to the hands-on policies come into play.  
This will mean that the member states finalises the agreements before they, actually reach the 
Commission for the final approval. This thus leads to the member states making compromises 
between each other in order to reach an agreement that they all can accept (Moravscik, 2005: 200). 
One member state may look for higher minimum wages, but may not prioritize pension schemes. 
This means that if a group of member states offers to increase minimum wages and another to 
decrease pension schemes, these two groups of member states will come to an agreement to change 
the EES in that direction. In this way Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues that in the end it is the 
member states that define the development of the EES. 
 During the EU summit in Lisbon in 2000 the labour market was discussed in regards to the 
OMC. During this meeting it was discussed and proposed to include a forum where social policies 
could be discussed. This was by some labour unions in Denmark, among other groups, received 
rather positively and to a large extent in accordance with the liberal intergovernmentalist line of 
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thought (Nielsen & Svensson, 2000). In this article the chairman of the time of the labour union LO 
Hans Jensen is quoted expressing satisfaction with the actions taken by the EU at this summit. He is 
quoted saying that it is very beneficial that there is provided some general guidelines to the social 
policy area by the EU. In the view of Liberal Intergovernmentalism this could be seen as an interest 
group participating in the promoting of preferences of the national states that they are a part of. He, 
Hans Jensen, and the labour union he represents are very content with the outcome of the summit as 
long as the organisation and Denmark as such benefits from it. He does though continue to say that 
the level of EU interference should be kept at a minimal level (Nielsen & Svenson, 2000). He does 
in the article argue that the European member states are too different from each other to be able to 
comply with the exact same rules (Hughes, 2005). It can be seen from the article that his view 
correlates with those of Liberal Intergovernmentalism in the sense that the theory also underlines 
the need of the member states to retain control without losing benefits. 
 An argument that links Rational Choice Theory and Liberal Intergovernmentalism is the 
notion of public opinion and thus general elections. It can be argued that European populations are 
content with their respective ways of going about different policies such as for instance the 
retirement age (Charlemagne, 2010). In this case a can be said that it is a popular opinion of the 
populations in some member states to maintain national policies on the retirement area rather than 
agreeing to a common EU wide common policy. As it can arguably be said that governments has a 
want to become re-elected it thus becomes a rational choice, for these governments, to follow the 
general opinion of their respective populations. This could, in a Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
perspective, lead to a preference of the OMC rather than the Community Method. In this argument 
the OMC allows the governments to follow the popular opinion of their respective populations and 
through that try to win upcoming elections. Community Method on the other hand would to a lesser 
extent allow the member states to follow this popular opinion. This could, arguably, lead the 
governments to prefer the OMC over the Community Method. 
 In an article from 2005 Eva Kjer Hansen, Danish Minister of Social Affairs at the time, 
expressed the same combination of approval and concern as the Danish labour union, LO (Hansen, 
2005). She though emphasises another dilemma in the situation, namely from the point of view 
when ”Globalization brings these problems [unemployment] to our doorstep, i.e. in the form of 
immigrants.”1 (ibid) She believes that sorting social issues in regards to employment would, and in 
fact does, decrease unemployment in other EU member states. Where the social guidelines directly 
 
1
 Own translation: ”Globaliseringen bringer disse problemstillinger til vores dørtrin, f.eks. i form af 
immigranter” (Hansen, 2005) 
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influences the Danish labour market positively it also positively affects the labour market in other 
EU member states. This will in the logic of Eva Kjer Hansen release the pressure of unemployed 
immigration in Denmark and thus further improve the Danish labour market. This is further 
positive, in the perspective of Eva Kjer Hansen, due to the notion that Denmark is not further 
obliged to follow EU legislation more than necessary. 
 Following the arguments of Eva Kjer Hansen the role of the institutions in Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism fits well. In the theory the role of the institutions is to facilitate the positive 
sum bargains made between the member states (Cini in Cini & Borragán, 2013: 80). In the case 
highlighted by Kjer Hansen the different member states benefit in different ways from the OMC 
and the EES. In order to fully benefit from these bargains the EU institutions must uphold some 
sense of formal framework. In the case of the OMC this formal framework is upheld through the 
guidelines established by the European Commission. The notion that the member states can 
compare their actual results to these guidelines ensures the credibility of the bargains made (ibid). 
5 . 3 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
To sum up this analysis of Liberal Intergovernmentalism in relation to the OMC and the EES 
it can be said that these fit well with the theory. This is because the EES created through the OMC 
promotes cooperation between the member states without limiting their maneuverability in regards 
to social policies. The Commission merely acts as the mediator that provides the framework for 
easing the process of reaching agreements. Unlike some of the other theories utilised in this project 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism does not see neither the necessity nor the possibility of the OMC 
developing into anything more than a soft law process. This is due to the member states benefiting 
the most from this soft law and that they furthermore are unwilling and perhaps unable to give up 
more sovereignty to the EU (Hughes, 2005; Charlemagne, 2010), which would be the case should 
the OMC be transferred into hard law and binding agreements. The fact that EES was not created 
thorugh the Community Method further points towards member states preference towards the 
OMC. 
5 . 4  H i s t o r i c a l  I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  A n a l y s i s  
When understanding the need for policy coordination and the EES including the processes 
surrounding it, namely the OMC, it is important to understand the previous success and failures of 
the EU in establishing common policies. The success of the Single European Act in establishing a 
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common European market that leads to the advent of the economic policy cooperation established 
and the Maastricht Treaty was the result of previous policy coordination amongst the member 
states. The economic cooperation and the expansion of the Union highlighted the need for further 
integration on other areas, especially employment and social policies, in order for the internal 
market to work at its optimal. One of the reasons this subject became important to the national 
politicians was the widespread public critique by workers unions in the entire EU. They called for 
more social action and integration in order for the internal market to work without providing 
opportunities for social dumping, welfare tourism etc. (Munksgaard, 1995). This public pressure 
would have forced the politicians to act or face the electoral consequences. The EU took the lead 
with the Delors White Paper that highlighted these needs and put further pressure on the member 
states, showing that the institution used the establishment of the single market, the Maastricht treaty 
and the following public dissatisfaction to promote an agenda independently of the member states.  
The Essen Strategy and formulation of the common goals on employment and social policies 
could be viewed as an unintended consequence of the economic cooperation and following 
dissatisfaction amongst powerful public groups in the EU. This comes down to the short term 
thinking of the politicians wanting economic cooperation to solve the problems at hand, not 
thinking about the long term needs for integration on other areas to actually make it work. However, 
once the cooperation is established and the gains can be seen, it constraints the future decisions. The 
public pressure from national unions gave the politicians a problem which in turn gave the Delors 
Commission the possibility to pressure the member states into further conferring competences, 
albeit very little initially. When the new countries entered the EU after the Maastricht, the situation 
changed, but the EU was locked in as an institution which meant that the new countries also had to 
“face” the unintended consequences of the economic cooperation. In general the system with which 
all new members of the Union must accept the ‘aquis communitare’ emphasises the point that 
finalised and established procedures in the EU will, according to Historical Institutionalism, remain 
subject to very little alteration without the willingness of the EU itself. 
After the Essen Summit the Council decided to establish a labour market committee 
consisting of two members per member state and only two from the Commission. The purpose of 
this committee was to survey the area and produce recommendations to be used to formulate a 
chapter for a treaty revision which happened with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. This can be seen 
as a clear institutionalisation of a policy area, slowly, but steadily moving the employment and 
policy area into the EU. 
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Establishing a treaty basis effectively gives the EU a framework for developing the area and 
maintaining an equilibrium on the policy area even though the member state policies shift. The 
“treatification” of the area also constrains the member states when making decisions on the area. 
Furthermore, transferring the responsibility to survey and formulate common goals and strategies 
on the area to the Commission, as happened with the EES after the Treaty of Amsterdam, gives the 
EU the opportunity to gain a knowledge advantage when negotiating with the Council on 
formulating the social policy goals of the EU. When the Commission proposes a common goal on 
how the member states should develop their social policies it is based on a Commission report and 
surveys stating the facts about the overall European situation. This gives the Council a difficult 
position to negotiate as it becomes difficult to argue against the observations made by the 
Commission. It should not be seen as a takeover by the Commission as there will obviously still be 
room for interpreting data. Instead, it should be seen as a conferral of responsibilities that will most 
likely lead the EU to develop a certain degree of recognised expertise on the area which will 
improve the EU's position.  
As established in the problem area, there were a prominent left-wing leadership in many 
influential European countries like Germany, Britain, Holland and Denmark during the 
establishment of the policy coordination through the EES with the OMC (Morel, Palier & Palme, 
2012: 46). These leaders established the OMC as the used method for coordinating social policies in 
the EU at a European Council summit in 2000 (Radelli, 2003: 14). This creates a very “sticky” 
situation as the policy coordination, once formalised in the EU as the OMC becomes very difficult 
to reform or revoke because of the unique historical situation with many prominent social 
democratic heads of state that created it. Reforming it through EU legislation can prove even more 
difficult as it is the Commission that have the competence to make proposals in the EU. And the 
likelihood of the Commission re-transferring their recommendation powers on the social policies 
back to the member states is small. This is due to the EU's ability as an established institution to 
maintain a relative political equilibrium even through a changing political climate while even 
promoting a separate agenda from the member states. And as the policy coordination continues and 
provides the gains that are expected the chances of having a situation where there is a consensus for 
changing it becomes even smaller. This can be seen in the 2005 revision of the EES. In 2005 the 
majority in Germany and Denmark had shifted to a centre right government. And even if at a glance 
the 2005 revision of the EES and the OMC process might seem like a watered down version of the 
initial strategy, it still adhere to the same overall objective established in 2000, the objectives 
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themselves, a flexible job market, re- and up-skilling of workers etc. building on a social democratic 
line of thought. 
The EES and the OMC process was revised because it did not provide the gains initially 
expected of it, as is exemplified in the 2005 revision of the strategy (Europa, 2003). It was 
concluded that the member states did not live up to their responsibilities in regards to reaching the 
common goals formulated by the Commission in conjunction with the Council. At this point it 
could be interpreted that with more than eight years of social policy coordination it was becoming 
an informal institution amongst the member states. This can be seen as the result of the 2005 review 
ended with a tightening of the Commission and thereby the EU's position in the coordination. In a 
historical institutionalist perspective, the decision to coordinate policies was at this point locked in. 
As argued in previously some emphasis must also be put on the informal rules and norms arising 
within the institutions. And as the member states not necessarily act on pure individual utility 
maximisation, this could be seen as an example of the actors within the Union acting according to 
the informal norms, social policy coordination, set up in 1995 with the Essen strategy. 
As mentioned institutions develop a degree of expertise when they have responsibilities 
conferred. This results in the institutions being the most proficient in dealing with certain issues 
after a period due to the continuity of an institution opposite of the often volatile political climate 
surrounding it. As the ESS and coordination on the area had already been done in the EU the step 
towards gaining the Commission the power not only to formulate the common goals but also the 
country specific recommendation on how to reach them, can be seen as an institutional 
development.  
The 2005 revision with the following shift in recommendation procedures did also set out to 
develop so-called ‘best practices’. The idea being that the methods used by the countries doing well 
in reaching the goals through their recommendations should be highlighted and put to more 
widespread use. This search for a single way of solving the problems can be seen as a way for the 
EU to keep control of the process and influence member state policies directly through the expertise 
it gains by being in granted control of the coordination process.  
5 . 3 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
To understand the conclusion, once again it is important to look at the history. The 
institutional framework surrounding the EES in the OMC have developed towards a more 
institutionalised process. Policy coordination and soft law might have been preferable to the 
member states because of the lack of commitment by the member states. However, once conferred 
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to the EU, the EU have been able to develop more or less independently from the member states 
original perspective, maintaining a political equilibrium making shifting governments commit to the 
process, shown by the 2005 review which was done by a strong centre right presence in Europe 
though still maintaining the original Social Democratic line of thought. With the review in 2005 it 
can be interpreted as if the EU has actually gained even further influence over the process due to the 
fact that the member states were not discussing the process with themselves but the Commission 
instead. While critics might argue that the EES in the OMC have been chosen by the member states 
because of its wide possibilities for interpretation and implementation. However, the need for 
integration on the area does not disappear if the member states do not comply with the policy 
coordination. Trying to circumvent the institutional development will lead to pressure for even 
further action towards complete institutional control over the process as happened with the 
economic and market policies in the EU. In the light of how previous policy coordinations have 
ended up with actual cooperation, the OMC would work better to develop the institution as it would 
have less sceptic than the Community Method though, over time, provide the same results. 
 
 
5 . 4  C o n s t r u c t i v i s t  A n a l y s i s  
During the 1990’s the European populations increasingly began to vote for left-wing 
governments. This signalled an emerging opposition towards neoliberal thoughts and policies 
across Europe (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012: 46). Neoliberal policies seemed to increase 
unemployment and social insecurity and hereby signalled a political crisis for European policy 
makers. 
This crisis led to a change towards more generous social policies and the adoption of the 
Social Investment Strategy on European level as evidenced by the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) (ibid). Analysed with Constructivism such a crisis could enable a change of identity across 
the EU and thus a change of norms in general. Therefore, as this section will return to later, a 
complete change of identity has not happened. The altered European identity may have favoured, 
among other things, a social policy which could then enable policy makers to agree on the EES and 
later the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) that would be used to develop it. 
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An alteration of the European identity can thus be argued to be a result of a political crisis in 
the EU. Initially then, the OMC may have been created on the grounds of a collective identity 
which has become to favour increasingly social policy. 
In Constructivism, identity is composed of rules and norms internalised by agents while it is 
also composed of their interests shaped by argumentation, deliberation and persuasion (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2006: 395). This may happen through a process of socialisation and social learning. 
Socialisation according to constructivists entail that actors internalise rules and norms they 
experience at their workplace or home, whereas social learning is concerned with how interests are 
shaped by engaging themselves in the same environments. Consequently, actors will eventually 
internalise implicit or explicit practises in a workplace such as the European Council and also alter 
their own interests accordingly. It is thus important to note that actors’ identities are fluctuant and 
therefore open to change – in stark contrast to the liberal intergovernmentalist notion of predisposed 
exogenous interests based on rational choice (ibid: 396). This does not mean that the result of 
socialisation necessarily will be actors who are in favour of the EU. Rather, Constructivism argues 
that agents will only internalise norms and rules which they find appropriate – they thus either 
automatically legitimise or reject those institutions through their identity. For a choice to be 
appropriate it must resonate with deeper norms, ideas and values (ibid: 396). The neofunctionalist 
argument can then be broadened in that identity for constructivists plays an increasingly crucial role 
while at the same time being able to account for the process of how socialisation works, something 
that neofunctionalists consider happen automatically when first begun (ibid). In this sense, the 
OMC may not be an agreement based on calculated choices, but an agreement which the actors 
found appropriate considering their various backgrounds. According to constructivism the OMC 
could then be regarded as a compromise made by the member states. In stating this, Constructivism 
may actually agree with Liberal Intergovernmentalism on the result – in that national preferences 
played a very important part in deciding that the OMC should become the major decision making 
procedure for the EES, but this may not be the only reason for adopting it. 
Where Liberal Intergovernmentalism would argue that this choice was based on a solely 
rational calculation weighing the respective member state’s best interest, Constructivism would 
rather look at for example the Commissionaires or the Council Ministers that may be wearing a 
‘double-hat’ due to their composition of identity. These actors have one foot in the national 
ministries, they are therefore to a certain degree exposed to certain practises and argument and since 
they also have one foot on the European level, they are also here exposed to other practices and 
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arguments which may shape their identity. Such actors are seen in the Council and the European 
Council where the 15 heads of state met. Here the different Council heads of state did not spend all 
their working time in the European institutions, but met occasionally (and meet, but as of now the 
number of members has increased to 27) to decide upon certain issues. Furthermore, these are 
replaced when for example governments shift. As argued in the neofunctionalist analysis there may 
be variations in the degrees of socialisation happening to actors working in EU institutions due to 
their moving between various institutions or their replacement. 
As evidenced by Poul Nyrup Rasmussens statements (Ritzaus Bureau, 2000), the Danish 
government was at the time quite positive towards the adoption of the OMC on the grounds that it 
set clear goals for the member states to deal with especially unemployment issues. At the same time 
a Danish labour market organisation, LO, stated that it were not in the interest of Denmark that the 
outcome of Lisbon resulted in a labour market not based on tripartite negotiations as it is now 
(Nielsen & Svensson, 2000). Furthermore, the European people may not necessarily be interested in 
a change of national social policy since many are accustomed to it and satisfied about it 
(Charlemagne, 2010). In other words, there may have been resistance towards a more strict method 
of coordination such as the Community Method. This was something the heads of states thus 
needed to consider while attending to their work in the European Council – hence they were 
wearing a double hat. 
Constructivism explains this by stating that actors, as mentioned, behave according to a logic 
of appropriateness – thus politicians from the Council may for example have been influenced or 
constrained by their respective member states’ ministries’ and popular reluctance to agree to an 
agreement that could risk giving the EU more competence on the area – as would a full blown 
Community Method and hence the heads of states saw that OMC could serve as a compromise. The 
OMC would now serve as a milestone for further progress for proponents of the EU project. 
Thus, the heads of state did not serve as mere conduits for the promotion of member state 
interest argued by Liberal Intergovernmentalism, but will definitely have an influence on the final 
result. The heads of state may thus have considered different aspects of the policy – hence what one 
is able to achieve given the institutional set up and what resonates with the agents own identity and 
what may have been appropriate in regards to national feelings. 
It can then be argued that the OMC was utilised to develop the EES on the grounds that the 
European identity turned towards increasingly favouring social police. 
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One can add to this argument saying that a more coherent, collective and strong European 
identity has not surfaced and this is the reason as to why the Community Method was not utilised 
for developing the OMC. In other words, even though the idea of an increasingly coordinating 
process may have been developed on the basis of an altered European identity favouring social 
policy, the result was the OMC because a sufficiently strong European identity has yet to be 
developed. Meaning that socialising processes in the European Council favouring increased 
European integration might have been constrained by Council ministers’ concern and weighing of 
national interests, thus resulting in them finding it most appropriate to negotiate a compromise that 
could be reached – namely the OMC. 
5 . 4 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
In the 1990’s Europe was faced with resistance towards neoliberal thoughts and policies. This 
resulted in a political crisis that could have enabled an alteration of European identity that further 
enabled the EES to be agreed upon and later the OMC to be developed. 
This altered identity favoured among other things social policy in contrast to the previous 
policy regime, but it is in the section here argued that this proposed alteration of identity was neither 
strong nor collective enough to reach an agreement on a more strict decision making process such 
as the Community Method. Thus, the OMC, may in this regard, have been a compromise that would 
serve to bring forward more coherent agreements on social policy, making member states relatively 
accountable to each other, but lacking further enforcement and harmonisation. This was due to 
decision makers being influenced by various factors such as popular opinion. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
C o n c l u s i o n  
6 . 1  C o n c l u s i o n  
 When looking at the four different theories and the way that they have been discussed in this 
project thus far, it is clear that different answers to the problem formulation appears. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism sees the OMC very positively and regards it as something that 
will not develop further into the Community Method. It is in the Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
analysis stated that emphasis is on the member states operating in the EU institutions. They may not 
have a particular interest in developing OMC into the Community Method. The member states will 
seek to rationally decide whether the approach of a common social policy is in their interest 
considering it may deprive them of the possibility of having individual control of their welfare 
systems. Thus, according to a Liberal Intergovernmentalist view, the EES is being developed by a 
soft law approach, the OMC, due to member states’ unwillingness to delegate powers to the EU. 
Compared to Neofunctionalism it is seen that there is a clear difference between these 
approaches. Neofunctionalism states the opposite of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, namely that the 
OMC is only a step on the way in terms of European integration. Contrary to Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism, Neofunctionalism argues that due to a spillover effect from the success of 
the economic policy, the EES was developed and that it eventually, will be almost certain, that a 
more strict decision making procedure will be utilised. The main difference between these two 
conclusions is obviously the different answers as to why the OMC was chosen to develop the EES. 
In short, Neofunctionalism attributes very little control to the member states and more control to the 
European institutions and the effect of spillover and socialisation within the European institutions. 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism attributes more control to the member states by claiming that they 
very effectively promote their own interests. 
 Historical Institutionalism concludes differently from both Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
and Neofunctionalism,that institutions can develop independently from the purpose of which they 
were created by the member states. Furthermore, it concludes that decisions made by the politicians 
representing the member states can have unintended consequences due their short sightedness. The 
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EES was an unintended consequence of the economic cooperation in the EU. When the EU began 
to have competences conferred it developed the competences into a stronger position than initially 
intended by the member states. 
In this light, the OMC would have been chosen to solve the problems at hand by the member states, 
however, as history have showed with the economic cooperation, the soft law will eventually lead 
to hard law. This is because the EU is able to maintain equilibrium even when the political climate 
surrounding it changes. Due to this, the EU and its policy areas become locked in and very resistant 
to change without internal willingness for such allowing for the independent institutional 
development. 
In regards to Constructivism this project has described that Neoliberalism, in the early 1990's 
increasingly met opposition. This lead to a political crisis in regards to how to proceed on the 
economic arena. The political crisis paved the way for an increased focus on social policies 
contained in the European identity which in turn opened for the foundation of the EES. Here 
Constructivism argues that the common European identity was not strong enough to lead to a usage 
of the Community Method but rather the OMC. Constructivism on this matter argues in line with 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, that national interests may have played an important role, but here 
Constructivism also nuances the argument. Where Liberal Intergovernmentalism ascribes this solely 
to rational calculations on the member states part, Constructivism argues that this is due the logic of 
appropriateness contained in the agents’ identity. The argument here being that in contrast to the 
liberal intergovernmental notion of member states as entities and sole actors, Constructivism 
accounts for other agents both at EU level and at the national level – as exemplified by the 
European Council’s heads of states being influenced by for example pressure from national 
electorates and ministries, thus having to decide for themselves what is appropriate in this given 
situation. The European Council also consisted then of 15 heads of state and that all of them may 
agree upon delegating more powers to the EU, so that a common social policy can be established 
through the Community Method, seemed rather unrealistic. 
The OMC in the view of Constructivism is a compromise reached on the basis of agents’ 
identities and not what was fully intended by any member state. This also opens up for the 
possibility that powers in the future may be increasingly delegated to the EU in terms of social 
policy and hence Constructivism elaborates on the socialising processes that Neofunctionalism 
presents, but is unable to explain in-depth. One can further link the constructivist argument to the 
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Neo Functionalist idea of spillover seeing that the economic policy became a part of the 
Community Method and that the EES also may experience this development. The constructivist 
argument places itself closer to the neofunctionalist one rather than the liberal intergovernmentalist. 
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C h a p t e r  7  
P e r s p e c t i v i s a t i o n  
7 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  P e r s p e c t i v i s a t i o n  
In this chapter it will be discussed what could have been done differently in the project 
considering the four theoretical approaches. 
7 . 2  P e r s p e c t i v i s a t i o n  
 In regards to Neofunctionalism one could, for further research, look into the role of the 
European Court of Justice. In this case it becomes relevant to look at how the ECJ in the 
neofunctionalist perspective promotes its own agenda through rulings on different cases. 
Furthermore, one could investigate the process of elite socialisation that takes place in the 
institution. This could be done by, for instance, investigating and interviewing the officials and 
jurists working with the cases. 
 In regards to Liberal Intergovernmentalism one could in a related project look further into 
the relationship between the theory and rational choice. This could be done by looking at how much 
a member state gains economically by further integration compared to how much gain there is in 
keeping the OMC as it is. To this, one could apply the logic of rational choice in order to localise 
the rational incentives for the member states to argue for a Liberal Intergovernmental approach. It 
would also benefit from more in depth empirical data that would in exemplify the different 
positions of the member states in regards to the creation of the OMC. 
The historical institutionalist approach would benefit well from a comparative approach. Had 
the project only used Historical Institutionalism it would have been interesting to compare the 
development of the smaller institutions in the EU with a compatible institution to document how 
they develop differently or similarly. The entire historic development in Europe could also have 
been taken into consideration looking at compatible situations and developments of politics. 
 
Constructivism could have been developed even further in that more specific data, from 
which one could have derived even more specific arguments on identity, could have been utilised. 
In this way a more sophisticated analysis would have been achieved and Constructivism’s 
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difference from Liberal Intergovernmentalism would have been even more significant. Furthermore, 
the elaboration of socialisation in Neofunctionalism, would have been increasingly nuanced. This 
would though have required a substantive amount of data about the very intricate doings of the 
Council Ministers and others. Combining the Constructivist approach with that of Peter Haas’ 
epistemic communities would also have enabled the project to possibly identify and map out how 
identities are influenced by various actors and groups. 
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